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ABSTRACT 
I argue for the Expanded Cluster Account of art (ECA) by first inquiring as to whether “art” is 
best described by a cluster account and where ECA fits into the current landscape of theories of 
concepts. Second, I explicate the relevant aspects of Boyd’s theory of natural kinds and argue 
that his concepts of “disciplinary matrices” and “homeostatic property clusters” (roughly 
analogous to Gaut’s criterial properties for characterizing art, particularized for each individual 
kind) have relevant roles in a proper cluster account of art, thus explicating and expanding 
Gaut’s account in the process. Third, I defend the thesis that Boyd’s concept of “disciplinary 
matrix,” when applied to “art,” is fulfilled by George Dickie’s notion of “the Artworld.” Lastly, I 
consider objections to ECA and positively explain its heuristic and explanatory efficacy above 
and beyond other contemporary “anti-definitional” accounts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The central project of defining ART in philosophical aesthetics was dominated by the 
method of conceptual analysis widely embraced by philosophers in the English-speaking world 
in the early part of the twentieth century. Conceptual analysis, ideally, allows philosophers to 
comprehend the core properties of our most complex concepts in the form of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. Yet if the measure of success for a science is the attainment of the ideal 
prescribed by its most dominant method of inquiry (conceptual analysis), then philosophy is 
undoubtedly in a state of despair. Justice, free will, knowledge, and art, among other far less 
extraordinary examples, have failed time and again to be defined by classical standards. This 
failure most contentiously and famously came to a head in Stich 1993,1 which calls for an 
overhaul of philosophical methodologies. 
 And it appears that philosophers of art are even more hesitant than other philosophers to 
accept that the concept ART cannot be classically defined. While ever since Morris Weitz’s “The 
Role of Theory in Aesthetics” there has been an undercurrent of anti-definitional approaches in 
philosophy of art, many (Noël Carroll [1993], for instance) have maintained that anti-definitional 
approaches are only part of the analysis, useful for “picking out” specific objects in the extension 
of art, yet maintain that a classical definition of art is still the proper goal of the inquiry. 
 In 2000, Berys Gaut proposed an innovative cluster account of art that can be 
summarized in three parts, given a set of criterial properties that “count towards” an object’s 
falling under the concept ART: (1) if an object instantiates all the properties, then the object falls 
under the concept ART since the criteria are jointly sufficient for the kind membership; (2) none 
of the properties is individually necessary for kind membership; and (3) there are disjunctively 
                                                
1 Stich argues here that conceptual analysis cannot provide a sufficiently explanatory notion of 
most concepts. 
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necessary properties for kind membership so that if an object falls under the concept ART it must 
have some set of the proposed properties (Gaut 2000: 33). For example, although Gaut is not 
committed to these criteria, Gaut considers the following set as prima facie plausible: 
(i) possessing positive aesthetic qualities (I employ the notion of positive aesthetic 
qualities here in a narrow sense, comprising beauty and its subspecies); (ii) being 
expressive of emotion; (iii) being intellectually challenging; (iv) being formally complex 
and coherent; (v) having a capacity to convey complex meanings; (vi) exhibiting an 
individual point of view; (vii) being an exercise of creative imagination; (viii) being an 
artefact or performance that is the product of a high degree of skill; (ix) belonging to an 
established artistic form; and (x) being the product of an intention to make a work of art. 
(Gaut 2005: 274) 
Yet, Gaut’s (2000) Cluster Account of Art currently resides in a state of philosophical limbo. 
Nearly four years have passed since Aaron Meskin allegedly refuted the account, but Gaut has 
remained silent. Only Francis Longworth and Andrea Scarantino’s article “The Disjunctive 
Theory of Art” (2010) could be considered a response to Meskin, but their defense comes at the 
cost of transforming Gaut’s cluster account into a formalized disjunctive account of art—a 
measured step away from Gaut’s anti-definitional approach to characterizing ART. One of the 
main goals of my project will be to both augment and improve Gaut’s original cluster account; 
and for this task I turn to an area of philosophy much less under the spell of classical 
definitions—the philosophy of natural kinds. 
 Richard Boyd’s homeostatic cluster property theory of natural kinds shows no affinity for 
classical definitions, but, like Gaut’s theory, it wholeheartedly embraces the fuzziness of our 
concepts of natural kinds. Instead of focusing on how to fix perfectly the extension of natural 
 3 
kinds, Boyd embraces the psychological and theoretical realities of our relations to natural kinds 
concepts and grounds his theory appropriately. The parallels between Boyd’s theory and Gaut’s 
theory are more than superficial: Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds has 
both structural and logical similarities to Gaut’s Cluster Account of Art. Boyd’s theory posits, as 
does Gaut’s, that kinds are determined by their associated cluster of properties. What is novel 
about Boyd’s account is its appeal to a “disciplinary matrix”; the “matrix” is a complex web of 
practices of the social and historical bodies “governing” kinds. For Boyd, disciplinary matrices 
are represented in academic disciplines or organizations involved in researching some kind or 
other of natural objects or phenomena. I will say more about how this may usefully be integrated 
into a Expanded Cluster Account in a moment. 
 Once I have successfully argued that Boyd’s disciplinary matrix may be unobtrusively 
incorporated into Gaut’s theory to create the Expanded Cluster Account, I will argue that George 
Dickie’s (1969) concept of the Artworld, on his own description, fills the role of the disciplinary 
matrix related to the concept ART. While both Boyd’s concept of the disciplinary matrix and 
Dickie’s are fairly sketchy, they share many functionally similar qualities in relation to their 
respective targets. Furthermore, it is possible to trace the historical development of Dickie’s 
notion of the Artworld and consider how it has changed in conjunction with our best historical 
reconstructions of the concept ART. I suggest that Arthur Danto’s (1964) inquiries into the “end 
of art” are nicely illustrative of the co-evolution of both Artworld and the concept ART; and this 
is exactly what we should expect from the Artworld if it functions analogously to Boyd’s 
disciplinary matrix. 
 Once I identify the value of incorporating Dickie’s Artworld into Boyd’s disciplinary 
matrix, to function as the disciplinary matrix for the concept ART, I will use the Expanded 
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Cluster Account to argue that, once a cluster account incorporates a reliable mechanism for 
choosing the relevant criteria for instantiating the concept ART, Meskin’s (2007) “irrelevant 
criteria” objection is dispelled. Since Meskin provides the only major unanswered criticism to 
Gaut’s Cluster Account of Art, I will argue the Expanded Cluster Account’s answer to Meskin is 
demonstrative of the efficacy of the Expanded Cluster Account. 
 Even with the Expanded Cluster Account defended against Meskin’s irrelevant criteria 
objection, it is still crucial that I distinguish my view from Longworth and Scarantino’s 
Disjunctive Theory. Since Longworth and Scarantino’s Disjunctive Theory moves a step away 
from Gaut’s original anti-definitional position to a fully formalized disjunctive definition (one 
that, contra Meskin, excises the possibility of irrelevant criteria), I argue that my approach 
expands on Gaut’s theory in a much more fruitful manner. The Disjunctive Theory of Art can 
best be characterized as a defensive posturing against Meskin’s irrelevant criteria objection, but 
the Expanded Cluster Account is a more comprehensive and overall positive addendum to Gaut’s 
position—it not only defends against Meskin’s criticisms, but adds to the explanatory efficacy of 
the account. I will argue for the explanatory and heuristic supremacy of the Expanded Cluster 
Account of Art first by echoing many of Gaut’s (2000) comments, but primarily on the grounds 
on which any proper theory should be tested: by determining the theory’s explanatory relevance 
to historical data and by arguing for the ways in which the inherent structural features of the 
account will support future predictions and accommodate novel instances of art objects. 
 The goals of this project are fivefold: 
1. To show that an inherently pluralistic approach to art as a concept will provide the best 
account. 
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2. To show that Boyd’s and Gaut’s theories have enough affinity to be successfully integrated 
into an Expand Cluster Account of Art. 
3. To show that, for ART, Dickie’s concept of the Artworld is an analog to Boyd’s disciplinary 
matrix. 
4. To show the Expanded Cluster Account of Art is sufficient to defend against Meskin’s (2007) 
criticisms. 
5. To show that the Expanded Cluster Account of Art is more explanatorily and heuristically 
effective than competing anti-definitional approaches to art. 
If I argue successfully for the five theses I have stated above, I believe the cumulative effect 
should make for a very convincing argument for the Expanded Cluster Account as a tenable and 
attractive candidate for defining art today. 
 
II. CONCEPTS 
 I will meet my first goal for this project by first establishing a survey of the relevant 
theories of concepts available (closely following Laurence and Margolis 1999). Based on this 
survey, I will argue that, based on both philosophical and psychological considerations, a 
pluralistic approach to concepts is the most tenable available theory. Departing slightly from 
Weiskopf 2009, I find that the structure of Gaut’s cluster account most closely resembles a 
pluralistic theory of the concept ART, which suggests that a cluster structure of the concept ART 
is the most tenable. Based on all of the psychological and philosophical data available today, a 
pluralistic, cluster structure of the concept ART is simply the most inclusive and explanatorily 
valuable. Before we begin, let me briefly note that some may wonder why someone interested in 
the anti-definitional project of art would start with a survey of theories of concepts. Because a 
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word expresses a special type of concept, a lexicalized concept, understanding the concept is 
equivalent to understanding the meaning of the word (Laurence and Margolis 1999: 4). Let us 
then consider the historical theories of concepts in (roughly) chronological order. 
 The most historically dominant theory of concepts is appropriately called the classical 
theory of concepts. Laurence and Margolis define the Classical Theory thusly: “Most concepts 
(especially lexical concepts) are structured mental representations that encode a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for their application” (1999: 10). The Classical Theory, owing to its 
historical predominance, is the most robust and well motivated—it has unified explanations of all 
the major components necessary for a complete theory of concepts (1999: 10). Given its long 
philosophical existence, like all philosophical theories, the Classical Theory has provoked plenty 
of worrying critiques. The philosophical and scientific landscapes are generally fuzzier and much 
more complex than in the time of the Classical Theory’s ubiquity, a fact which has proved the 
most problematic for the theory. The most apt criticisms object to the Classical Theory based 
primarily on its inability to account for recent data and phenomena. For instance, modern 
psychological research shows little evidence that lexical concepts have a definitional structure, 
and they lack psychological evidence of typicality effects. Multiple studies, most prominently 
performed by Kintsch (1974) have demonstrated that there is no correlation between a lexical 
concept’s definitional complexity and its psychological complexity (Laurence and Margolis 
1999: 17). 
 Kintsch (1974) demonstrated the lack of definitional structure in lexical concepts by 
measuring phoneme recognition after a given word. If definitional structure were psychologically 
relevant, one would suppose that more definitionally complex words would require a greater 
processing load, and thus phoneme recognition after a more complex lexical concept would be 
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slower than phoneme recognition after a simpler lexical concept, but this is not the case 
(Laurence and Margolis 1999: 17-18). Further psychological research suggests that concepts 
display a typicality structure—a structure that seems incommensurate with the definitional 
structure of the Classical Theory. That is to say, if objects in the world meet the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for falling under a concept, then it is strange that people would consistently 
rate a set of objects all of which seem to fall under a given concept as more or less typical than 
others (1999: 24). For instance, people are much more likely to rate an apple than a pomegranate 
as a “typical” fruit. Rosch (1973) and others have replicated the typicality effect in lexical 
concepts many times over. Given the Classical Theory’s inability to account for effects 
demonstrated by Kintsch’s and Rosch’s experiments, it appears that Classical Theory does not 
seem very psychologically realistic. Furthermore, not only in the philosophy of art, but also 
historically, there simply are very few actual examples (and even fewer interesting examples) of 
concepts for which we have discovered clear necessary and sufficient conditions. This may be a 
problem closely related to another charge often waged against the Classical Theory: it seems to 
have difficulty dealing with conceptual fuzziness. Since most concept theorists accept that at 
least some concepts are naturally fuzzy, it is worrying that the definitional structure of the 
Classical Theory may not be adequate for capturing this fuzziness. This is an explanation for the 
Classical Theory’s lack of success—it simply cannot capture the fuzziness inherent in concepts 
such as ART. 
 While few consider any one of the above pieces of evidence to be decisive against the 
Classical Theory, taken as a whole they suggest a considerable amount of doubt in regard to the 
possibility of concepts having the definitional structure described by the Classical Theory. And if 
our concept ART does not even seem to have a definitional structure, it seems counterproductive 
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to assume that, in principle, there may still exist necessary and sufficient conditions for defining 
art. That is to say, if the concept ART cannot be represented in our minds as having a definitional 
structure, why should we suppose we could construct necessary and sufficient conditions for 
picking out art objects in the world? Let us now consider some problems with other non-classical 
theories of concepts. 
 Inspired by Rosch’s infamous experiments revealing the typicality effect in lexical 
concepts, critics of the Classical Theory began to posit various Prototype Theories of concepts. 
Laurence and Margolis characterize Prototype Theory as positing that “most concepts (especially 
lexical concepts) are structured mental representations that encode the properties that objects in 
their extension tend [my italics] to possess” (1973: 31). For example, if the concept MUSIC is 
composed of features like ‘is listened to’, ‘is harmonic’, ‘is rhythmic’, and ‘is emotionally 
salient’ then the Rolling Stones’ “Wild Horses” falls under the concept MUSIC because it has all 
of these features. On the other hand, an almost completely atonal work like Keith Fullerton 
Whitman’s “Lisbon” also falls under the concept, despite its lacking harmonies and consistent 
rhythm, because it is still both listened to and emotionally salient. For our purposes, there are a 
couple of importantly differentiable versions of Prototype Theory. One version of Prototype 
theory takes there to be a set properties, extrapolated from studies of the properties the folk find 
most typical, which are statistically weighted to indicate what is more or less typical of the 
objects in the extension of the concept (Dean 2003: 30). A proposed second version of Prototype 
Theory follows a radial structure that could be construed as an updated theory of Wittgenstein’s 
family resemblance theory. A radially-structured Prototype Theory is one in which: 
There is central case or cases (such cases could be prototypes, but they could also 
be stereotypes, ideals, exemplars, etc.) upon which conventionalized variations 
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are based, but that are not generated from, and cannot be predicted by, general 
rules; variations on the central case must be learned individually. (Dean 2004: 31) 
Prototype Theories share among them the same benefits and problems. 
 The boon of Prototype Theory is that is addresses both the issues of psychological reality 
and fuzziness that plagued the Classical Theory. Prototype Theory can account for the predicted 
results of Rosch’s typicality effect and does not posit a definitional structure disputed by 
Kintsch’s findings. Furthermore, it seems to be much more successful in characterizing generally 
a lot of concepts and their extensions. However, as the first real contender to Classical Theory, 
Prototype Theory has plenty of problems to face. Several good reasons to believe that Prototype 
Theory cannot generally account for concepts include: the lack of prototypes for some concepts, 
the inability to account for the typicality effect, and the failure of prototype structures to account 
for atypical cases. 
 Perhaps the most worrisome evidence against a general Prototype Theory of concepts is 
that there are undoubtedly concepts that do not have a clear prototype. For example, consider the 
concept MUSIC MASTERED IN STUDIOS IN THE MIDWEST. For one thing, the concept of 
music mastered in studios in the Midwest seems too specific for an average person to have 
enough knowledgeable interaction to develop a prototype. We should also consider that since 
music mastered in studios in the Midwest is such a broad extension, it would be difficult for a 
prototype to typify the extension by any reasonable standard. Straightforwardly, the existence of 
specific and complex concepts that do not lend themselves to prototypical structure seems to 
undermine any claim to full generality of the Prototype Theory. 
 Furthermore, while some concepts may not have prototypes, even some concepts that 
uncontroversially do have prototypes do not seem to account for atypical cases in their extension. 
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GRANDMOTHER is a concept that has a clear prototype: old, gray hair, glasses, and kind to 
children, and so on. However, there are plenty of grandmothers who may not meet any of these 
properties at all, including atypically young grandmothers (Laurence and Margolis 1999: 34). On 
the other hand, the prototype of GRANDMOTHER may pick out a large number of the females 
at a retirement home, including plenty who do not actually have any grandchildren. Prototype 
Theory is an imperfect guide to picking out objects in a concept’s extension in many cases. 
 Lastly, despite its having been originally motivated by the discovery of the typicality 
effect in Rosch 1973, a prototype structure of concepts may not actually be suggested by the 
data. In order to prove this, Armstrong et al. (1983) tested well-defined concepts, such as even 
numbers, to see if they also demonstrated the typicality effect. Armstrong et al. did, in fact, find 
that even well-defined concepts, which subjects even acknowledged as binary categories (either 
a number is or is not even), were rated by subjects oddly; for instance, 8 was rated as more 
typically even than 34 (Laurence and Margolis 1999: 32). This would seem to suggest that even 
for concepts that may very well display a definitional structure as posited in the Classical 
Theory, subjects in psychological studies are more than willing to give typicality ratings for 
members of the extension. It is unsettled whether Armstrong et al.’s findings are conclusive 
evidence against the Prototype Theory, but such findings at least raise suspicion as to the 
universality of the Prototype Theory of concepts.2 
 A more recent response to both the Classical and Prototype Theories of concepts has been 
to modify an idea based on models of scientific reasoning: the Theory-Theory of concepts. 
Theory-Theory posits that “concepts are representations whose structure consists in their 
                                                
2 Prototype theory’s inability to account for reverse compositionality is often cited as a major 
flaw (see Fodor and Lepore 1996). I do not discuss it here because I believe it is a mistaken 
criticism (as argued in Robbins 2005). 
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relations to other concepts as specified by a mental theory” (Laurence and Margolis 1999: 47). 
The advantages of Theory-Theory revolve around theorist’s ability to apply the same cognitive 
mechanisms of theory change used in scientific development to all realms of cognition. That is to 
say, in Theory-Theory there is already a significant literature about the development of scientific 
theories and the mechanisms that govern these changes; therefore, if Theory-Theory holds, all of 
these tools should be immediately at the explanatory disposal of those explaining the 
development of concepts generally. The supposed advantages of Theory-Theory, however, 
generate their own set of problems, including the apparent independence of concepts from their 
enmeshed mental theory and the problems with extrapolating mechanisms of scientific theory 
development to concepts generally, since the mechanisms are relatively poorly understood. Let 
us consider these general critiques of Theory-Theory. 
 The objection concerning the independence of concepts from their enmeshed mental 
theory is actually two-fold; there are the cases in which people are able appropriately to 
determine the extension of their concept despite an inadequate or incorrect associated mental 
theory, and there is the case of how concepts seem stable or invariant despite sometimes radical 
changes in the associated mental theory. Consider the case of the average person’s concept of a 
slow loris. There is little evidence that most people have slow loris-theories robust enough to 
determine the extension of the concept. Perhaps they have a vague notion of genetic endowment 
as content for the concept, but this highly unspecified intuition of genetic endowment seems to 
pick out slow lorises no more uniquely than it would pick out the content of people’s concepts of 
platypuses or bald eagles. That is to say, most folk would not be able to specify how a theory of 
genetic endowment distinguishes, say, a tortoise from a lemur. And if people’s conceptual 
content is merely a vague notion of essence or genetic endowment, then what allows them to 
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determine the different concept’s respective extensions? (Laurence and Margolis 1999: 47) A 
related problem is the stability of concepts across time and changes in theory. By hypothesis, 
Theory-Theory should hold that, due to the close relationship between a concept and its place in 
a mental theory, differences or changes in a mental theory should produce changes in the content 
of its embedded concepts. However, there is good evidence that there can be substantial changes 
or differences among mental theories that produce relatively stable conceptual content. Consider 
Laurence and Margolis’ example: 
Suppose, for instance, that your theory of animals says that animals are entirely physical 
entities while your friend's theory of animals says that some animals (perhaps humans) 
have nonphysical souls. This might mean that you don't both possess the same concept 
animal. Still, by hypothesis, you both possess concepts with similar contents, and though 
strictly speaking they aren't the same, they are similar enough to say that they are both 
animal-concepts. (1999: 49) 
This is problematic in the sense that it seems to suggest that, in fact, our concepts are not 
sensitive to the beliefs or theories in which they are embedded. 
 A second worry stems from the motivational force behind the Theory-Theory of 
concepts. Some claim that one of the advantages of Theory-Theory is that, if it holds, it allows us 
access to the history of research in studying the mechanisms of scientific development for 
explanatory use. However, it remains an open question just how useful the studied mechanisms 
of scientific development might be if they themselves are quite vague. It is not clear that there is 
a robust and uncontroversial account of the mechanisms that engender scientific theory changes, 
for instance. In the theories of scientific development alone, however, there is much work to be 
done to find any full notion of mechanisms that would be explanatorily helpful if they could be 
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extrapolated to concepts in general. Given the still nascent theories of scientific development, 
specifically of the mechanisms involved therein, it can be construed, at best, as disingenuous to 
consider this an advantage for Theory-Theory, and, at worst, as an objection to any true 
motivational force behind a Theory-Theory of concepts (Laurence and Margolis 1999: 51). 
 Following Laurence and Margolis’ survey of canonical theories of concepts, I wish also 
to consider the heterogeneous group of Neoclassical theories of concepts here. While anything 
resembling the Classical Theory is considered archaic by most psychologists (it is generally 
considered incompatible with psychological research), other researchers conversant with 
cognitive science, particularly linguists, find Neoclassical theories useful. The Neoclassical 
Theory posits that “most concepts (esp. lexical concepts) are structured mental representations 
that encode partial definitions, i.e., necessary conditions for their application” (Laurence and 
Margolis 1999: 54). While Laurence and Margolis review several points of critique for the 
Neoclassical Theory, due to space and relevance, I will note only one critique here: what 
Laurence and Margolis call the “Problem of Completers” (Laurence and Margolis 1999: 59). 
 The primary issue with Neoclassical theories from our standpoint is that the concepts 
they posit encode only partial definitions. However, for those of us interested in the nature of 
concepts, it is unclear how Neoclassical theorists suppose concepts apply to their instances—if a 
concept encodes only the necessary conditions for application, then it cannot alone adjudicate 
between instances that have all the necessary features and fall under the concept and instances 
that have all of the necessary features yet still do not fall under the concept. If Neoclassical 
theorists posited that concepts also encoded sufficient conditions, the problem of application 
would be solved, but then the Neoclassical Theory seems to encounter all of the same problems 
as the Classical Theory outlined previously (Laurence and Margolis 1999: 55). Therefore, the 
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Neoclassical Theory seems to exist as a paradox for those who have interests outside of 
linguistics and natural language: either the theory remains as is but provides no explanation for 
how concepts pick out their extension correctly or the theory is “completed” by adding sufficient 
conditions, in which case it basically becomes a permutation of the Classical Theory. 
 While the “Problem of Completers” may seem fatal for the Neoclassical Theory, I believe 
it is actually a false dichotomy; there is the option, one that has been taken with all of these 
theories at some point, to hybridize. One option in hybridization is to propose a Dual Theory of 
concepts. The primary motivation behind a Dual Theory is to pick from the available theories 
both in order to account for the “conceptual core” (usually given by Classical Theory) to provide 
a mechanism for “picking out” instances of the concept (most often borrowed from Prototype 
Theory). In fact, at the end of their survey, even Laurence and Margolis propose their own 
idiosyncratic formulation of a hybrid theory. However, hybrid theories seem simply to repeat the 
mistake that bedevils “simple” theories: Dual Theories argue that all concepts share the same 
mental structure, even if concept structure is a more complex structure than non-hybrid theories. 
Weiskopf (2009) provides the best and most concise discussion of the problem of assuming a 
generalizable mental structure across all concepts and argues positively for a pluralistic theory of 
concepts. All of the theories of concepts surveyed above have both advantages and 
shortcomings, however, it should be noted that most critiques of the above theories stem from 
their generalizability. For instance, the Classical Theory excels in its clarity and robust 
explanatory power of the mechanisms of concepts, but falters in its ability to be generalized to 
fuzzy and complex concepts. The Prototype Theory, likewise, has advantages in explaining 
certain psychological realities and dealing with fuzzy cases, but falters when we attempt to 
impose its structure on very specific concepts such as MUSIC MASTERED IN A STUDIO IN 
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THE MIDWEST. Theory-Theory has the advantage of bridging the mechanisms of scientific 
conceptual development and the concepts of the folk, but often finds problematic instances in the 
most basic concepts such as ANIMAL. Lastly, Neoclassical Theories have the advantage of 
being explanatorily consistent with linguistic account of verbs, for instance, but they ultimately 
face the same generalizability problems as the Classical Theory of concepts (or, rather, are just 
incomplete and barely generalizable at all). 
 A pluralistic account of concepts denies the assumption that forces these theories into a 
dire stalemate: pluralism denies the assumption that all concepts share the same representational 
structure (Weiskopf 2009: 7). Pluralism also posits that (1) the representational kinds of concepts 
are heterogeneous, (2) the representational kind of the concept used is occasionally determined 
by context, and (3) that what in classic theories would be considered a single concept may now 
be represented by several distinct mental representations with similar or equivalent extensions. 
While Weiskopf suggests a number of representational kinds specific to his psychological 
concerns, there is no reason not to consider the possibility that all of the general theories 
surveyed are suitable candidates for the functional role of mentally representing concepts. In 
fact, the ubiquity and genuine explanatory power of all of the theories surveyed above make the 
case that there are multiple representational kinds of concepts—none of the theories above is 
fully sufficient or thoroughly deficient. And since the assumption that concepts are all of one 
representational kind seems ungrounded,3 why not simply jettison the assumption? 
 Returning from our survey of theories of concepts to our primary discussion about art, we 
must consider the implications of endorsing the most reasonable theory, pluralism about 
concepts. Many theories of art could be picked out as correlates to the theories of concepts 
                                                
3 See Weiskopf (2009) for a strong argument on why endorsing pluralism does not lead to 
eliminativism about concepts. 
 16 
presented above. Formalism, for instance, compares to the (Neo)Classical Theory of concepts: 
both attempt to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for ART. And Jeffrey Dean (2003) 
argues for a prototype theory of art based on the Prototype Theory of concepts. However, the 
only current theory of art that can be reasonably considered pluralistic is Gaut’s Cluster Account 
of Art. 
 Gaut’s Cluster Account of Art is pluralistic in the sense that it provides the logical 
structure to count various sets of properties as properly instantiating ART. However, the 
philosophical project of defining art differs fundamentally from the psychological project of 
cataloging the representational structure of concepts. While the psychological project seeks 
answers about the representational structures of concepts to better understand our psychology, 
the philosophical project seeks to capture the extension of the lexical term “art.” Hence, it would 
be mistaken to consider the pluralism of the Cluster Account of Art to be same in kind as 
Weiskopf’s pluralism. Rather, Weiskopf’s conceptual pluralism is similar in structure to the 
Cluster Account. Weiskopf’s theory of concepts is pluralistic inasmuch as there are several 
different representational structures that may happen to instantiate different concepts 
(psychologically speaking) that happen to share the same lexical term. Similarly, Gaut’s Cluster 
Account is pluralistic inasmuch it allows for multitudinous sets of criteria to count towards 
instantiating a single lexical term. Both Weiskopf’s and Gaut’s pluralism share a structure of 
capturing seemingly disparate entities under a single lexical term, namely, “art.” And it is this 
sense that the Cluster Account of Art (and by extension the Extended Cluster Account of Art), 
may be appropriately understood as pluralistic in a way similar to our best current understanding 
of concepts in psychology.  
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III. PROPERTY CLUSTERS AND DISCIPLINARY MATRICES 
The argument for my second goal, that Boyd’s disciplinary matrix can be fruitfully 
integrated into Gaut’s Cluster Account of Art will be an argument by analogy; I begin by 
showing the functional similarities between Gaut’s account of the concept ART and Boyd’s 
theory of natural kinds. To wit, Boyd’s and Gaut’s theories both use the structure of the cluster to 
describe their target concepts. One important difference between Boyd’s and Gaut’s theories, 
however, is that Boyd has identified a framing mechanism for how natural kinds come to be 
defined by their general cluster, the “disciplinary matrix.” One of the areas in which Gaut’s 
theory may be improved is precisely in that it posits no mechanism for determining the actual 
criteria of the concept ART’s cluster, which is precisely the function of Boyd’s disciplinary 
matrix for natural kinds. 
Prima facie, Boyd and Gaut may appear to be addressing two different questions. Boyd is 
hoping to answer questions regarding the metaphysics of natural kinds and the nature of 
reference for kind terms, with the aim of picking out kinds useful for reliable inductive 
generalizations, relative to a specific domain (or discipline) of inquiry (2007, p. 147). Gaut 
explores the way in which the term “art” is used in language in hopes of providing a sensible 
way of determining the concept’s extension, in an attempt to account for the relevant properties 
of a specific kind—namely the kind “art”—that facilitate reliable inductive generalizations, such 
as the type of brushstrokes one may expect to find in an Impressionist painting. Boyd’s view 
relies on two major theses: (1) what he calls the homeostatic property cluster (HPC) thesis and 
(2) the accommodation thesis. Since the HPC thesis closely approximates the structure of Gaut’s 
Cluster Account of Art, I argue that is both possible and beneficial to integrate the 
accommodation thesis into an expanded cluster account of art. 
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 Boyd’s theory of an HPC kind may be characterized as a contingent, “naturally occurring 
clustering of properties with the consequence that (1) it lacks precisely defined membership 
conditions and, sometimes (2) the properties in the defining cluster vary over time and/or space” 
(2010: 216). Insofar as conditions (1) and (2) apply to a HPC kind on Boyd’s formulation, Boyd 
suggests that there must be an underlying “homeostatic mechanism” that allows for the natural 
variance of properties between individual kind members and for the drift of properties over time 
while retaining a stable kind-term categorization (1999: 143-4). And insofar as HPC kinds are 
regulated by an underlying “homeostatic mechanism,” Boyd asserts such kind terms are fitting to 
the natural “contours” of the world’s causal structure, thereby making inductive generalizations 
about HPC kinds generally reliable (1999: 143-4).  
 In this respect, Boyd’s HPC account shares a close structural and logical affinity with 
Gaut’s Cluster Account of Art.4 Gaut is not concerned with defending any particular set of 
criterial properties; indeed, he argues that one of the virtues of the cluster account is that its 
proponents can, in the face of counterexamples, “respond by modifying the content of the 
account, rather than its form” (2000:  33). And Gaut believes not only that this is a successful 
strategy, but also that it can account for changes in the notion ART throughout history (2000:  
32). 
  If one sets aside the terminological differences between Gaut’s and Boyd’s accounts, 
several structural similarities emerge, including that: (1) a kind (i.e., Gaut’s “art” kind or one of 
Boyd’s HPC kinds) is not determined by an eternal and immutable set of properties, but (2) by a 
general set of properties, which are only jointly sufficient, but which (3) have multiple sufficient 
subsets, and (4) this set of determining properties may vary over time and space, while the 
                                                
4 See page 1-2 above for the logical structure of Gaut’s account. 
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intension of the kind term remains consistent. Boyd is committed to (1), (2) and (3) in virtue of 
his beliefs that HPC kinds have natural variances between members at any given time and that 
there is still a specific (i.e. homeostatic) cluster of properties that determine an object’s kind 
membership. Thus, if “having a trunk” is a relevant property of the homeostatic cluster for 
elephants, even the trunkless kin of elephants would still be considered elephants—the trunkless 
elephant still instantiates enough (a sufficient subset) of the properties of the homeostatic cluster 
(such as “having elephant parents” and “having gray skin”) to qualify as a member of the 
elephant kind. With respect to (4), Boyd is expressly committed to the idea that the “property 
cluster is individuated like a historical object or process: certain changes over time (or space) in 
the property cluster or in the underlying homeostatic mechanisms preserve the identity of the 
defining cluster” (1999: 144). Condition (4) of Boyd’s HPC theory is intended to account for 
cases of natural microevolutionary changes in a species, for example. Gaut is expressly 
committed in the conditions of the logical form of the cluster account (as summarized above) to 
at least (1), (2) and (3). But Gaut is also committed to (4) insofar as he believes that this is one of 
the primary virtues of the cluster account: that it is malleable enough to respond to developments 
in the artworld while preserving a stable notion of art (2000: 32-33).  
 With the structural and logical affinities of Gaut’s and Boyd’s cluster accounts outlined, 
let us now approach the second aspect of Boyd’s theory of kinds, his accommodation thesis: 
The basic lesson here is that the epistemic reliability of scientific practices in a 
disciplinary matrix (when and to the extent they are reliable) depends on many 
dimensions of accommodation between (on the one hand) conceptual features of practice 
in that matrix like its theories, concepts, classificatory practices, inferential standards of 
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experimental design, etc., and (on the other hand) the causal powers of the phenomena 
under study. (Boyd 1999: 217) 
This is to say, insofar as one wants to be able to make sustainable, true claims about the members 
of a given kind (including its nature, causal powers, and properties), there must be a disciplinary 
matrix that determines the kind by its use in those very types of judgments. A disciplinary matrix 
is “a family of inductive and inferential practices united by common conceptual resources, 
whether or not these correspond to academic or practical disciplines otherwise understood” 
(1999: 148). A community that uses the kind-concept and -term for theoretical and practical 
purposes comprises a disciplinary matrix for a kind. Academic research (sub-)fields as ecology, 
organic chemistry, and particle physics are instances of such communities. However, it would be 
wrong to think that academic research fields outside of the exact sciences fail to create 
disciplinary matrices. Comparative psychology, for instance, employs kind terms from a 
common conceptual set that are used in theoretical and inductive practices. In comparative 
psychology there is a kind term for “lateral inhibition” that allows psychologists to explain and 
infer certain patterns of behavior and processing.  
 Moreover, by the accommodation thesis, disciplinary matrices and kind terms are relative 
to each other. For example, the kind term “water” has very different theoretical and inductive 
uses in ecology than in chemistry, and thus will emphasize a different set of relevant properties 
in the total cluster. For ecology, the relevant properties of water are its life-sustaining features 
and the dynamics of its flow, since it is used in explanations and inferences about environmental 
niches and adaptability. In chemistry, the relevant properties of water are its chemical structure 
and composition, since it is used in explanations and inferences about solubility and phase 
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change. Of course, not every kind term will be useful or relevant to every disciplinary matrix—
for example, the economic kind term “demand” is irrelevant to particle physics. 
 Does the kind term “art” relate to a specific disciplinary matrix? Can we say that ART is 
related to a recognized discipline in such a way as to create or identify a matrix for it that will 
allow us to treat it like Boyd treats HPC kind terms? After all, ART appears to be much more 
nebulous than the kinds determined by the exact sciences. Nevertheless, ART does meet all the 
criteria for kindhood as proposed by Boyd above. Artworks share a set of causal powers of 
interest to a community that uses the concept in theorizing, classification schema, and inferential 
judgments. For example, one candidate for a causal power of artworks is to command 
appreciation. Why would we for so long have tried to unite artworks under a single definition if 
they did not have causal powers worthy of our attention? In many ways, the search for these 
causal powers is the search for a definition of art—what makes art unique? The ability to 
command aesthetic appreciation is a causal power that distinguishes unorganized noise from 
music, a child’s finger-painting from a Rothko.  Consider again the kind term “water” and its 
relation to chemistry. The history of water from the perspective of chemistry has been a history 
of identifying its causal powers relevant to chemistry itself. “Art” is a term that is useful for 
making reliable generalizations about a given object. To deem an object a work of art implies 
that it has the properties of being the product of a human action and being something intended 
for an audience, for instance. And as the classifications of a kind term become more specific, 
more generalizable properties become apparent; there are more interesting generalizations we 
can make about a specific group of artworks, such as “impressionist paintings,” than about the 
more general concept ART. Third, “art” plays a pivotal role in the theorizing, inferential 
structures, and classificatory practices of at least a handful of disciplines. “Art” is a kind term by 
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which some disciplines such as aesthetics and art history demarcate their proper objects of study. 
Kind terms such as “green” or “symmetrical” or “lyrical” will be necessary for disciplines such 
as art criticism and studio art. As we saw in the case of the kind term “water” above, “art” is a 
kind term not specific to one discipline; it may occur, but play a decidedly different role, in 
disciplines such as sociology and anthropology. It appears then, that by Boyd’s definition of 
HPC kinds, “art” is a proper kind term that relates to a variety of disciplinary matrices. 
 When we integrate Boyd’s accommodation thesis and disciplinary matrices into Gaut’s 
Cluster Account of Art, some important consequences follow. Most importantly, there are the 
structural consequences of the theory to consider. In Gaut’s account, there is no mechanism for 
generating the relevant properties of the cluster. Gaut proposes ten criteria he believes are good 
candidates, but these are simply criteria gleaned from other definitions of art and from his own 
intuitions—Gaut does not argue for his proposed criteria, but only for the logic of his account. 
But using an expanded cluster account of art, anyone may argue that she has chosen the correct 
set of properties of the cluster for ART (relative to a disciplinary matrix) because there is a 
historical community, creators and keepers of the corresponding disciplinary matrix, that agrees 
on the relevant set of properties that determine whether an object falls under the concept ART. 
 While it may seem subtle, the incorporation of a disciplinary matrix into the expanded 
cluster account makes it significantly different from Gaut’s account of art. On Gaut’s account, a 
philosopher may propose a certain set of criteria for the determination of artworks, which she 
believes to be correct, and she may provide compelling reasons why her criteria are appropriate. 
This way of determining a set of criterial properties is explanatorily ahistorical. The criterial set 
is proposed from a contemporary perspective and projected on to historical artifacts, like 
American Indian and ancient pottery. The disciplinary matrix, on the contrary, provides an 
 23 
essentially historical manner of determining the criteria, in which the proposed criteria are based 
on real historical and circumstantial usage. On the expanded cluster account, the set of properties 
in the cluster for ART is determined by the related communities in which the concept is used, 
with the community and concept co-evolving over time and space, and, importantly, without 
changing the intension. That is to say, the ahistorical model looks at the usage of the concept in 
its current form and then imposes its modern standpoint onto history. On the other hand, a 
historical approach investigates the usage of the concept as an evolving phenomenon, 
researching both the concept’s usage and corresponding disciplinary and historical circumstances 
that develop through time to arrive at a theory. The historical approach is much more likely to 
produce good inferences and theories about both the contemporary concept the historical concept 
ART, rather than clumsily attempting to infer backwards from a modern standpoint. And it is 
precisely this important shift in epistemological authority that I believe answers Meskin’s 
concerns, as I will argue shortly. 
 
IV. THE ARTWORLD 
 Having established the logical and structural viability of conceiving of ART as a Boydian 
HPC kind, there remains the question of identifying its relevant disciplinary matrix. I have 
already named some academic disciplines whose matrices employ the kind “art,” but if we were 
to only consider these disciplines, we would determine a much more idiosyncratic notion of “art” 
than the folk employ. Indeed, it seems presumptuous to assume that art historians, sociologists, 
and trained studio artists share the same concept ART as the folk (or even as each other). If 
academic fields are too idiosyncratic in their concept ART, might we then turn to a more 
intellectually diverse institution? I maintain that the disciplinary matrix that corresponds with the 
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common usage of “art” is the “family of inductive and inferential practices united by common 
conceptual resources” (1999: 148) that emerges from what George Dickie has previously called 
the “artworld.” 
 Following Arthur Danto (1964), George Dickie defines the artworld as the totality of 
artworld systems that are “framework[s] for the presentation of a work of art by an artist to the 
artworld public” (Dickie 2000: 101); so, for example, art galleries (and their patrons, curators, 
owners, critics, etc.), theaters (and their patrons, curators, owners, critics, etc.), and museums 
(and their patrons, curators, owners, critics, etc.). While Dickie and I recognize his definition is 
circular, he is right in insisting that the “artworld” is a commonsense notion with which 
Westerners are familiar by a young age. Dickie considers “art gallery entrepreneurs, museum 
curators, art critics, art theorists, philosophers of art, and others” all examples of players in the 
modern-day artworld (2000: 102). Dickie’s artworld is a good candidate for the role of that 
community that supports the disciplinary matrix corresponding to the concept ART. Philosophers 
of art, art theorists, and other members of the artworld incorporate ART into their inductive, 
classificatory, and theoretical practices; yet the generality introduced by including museum 
curators and the artworld public into the definition saves the artworld from being too esoteric a 
community to determine the common usage of “art.” Furthermore, Dickie recognizes the 
malleable and historical nature of the artworld qua actual institution. Dickie posits that the 
artworld has “occurred [in] many different times in many different cultures” and suggests it 
began as very socially primitive and has developed to the social complexity of the modern 
Western artworld (2000: 102). The practices of Dickie’s artworld meet all of the criteria of the 
“disciplinary matrix” as defined by Boyd above and, prima facie, they do so more 
comprehensively than any other candidate. 
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 One may object to using Dickie’s artworld as the disciplinary matrix for ART on purely 
definitional grounds—most of Dickie’s opponents have focused on the aforementioned 
circularity in his theory, as well as its lack of necessary and sufficient conditions for ART. For 
our purposes, however, these common charges against Dickie are not important. My goal here is 
to pick out the institutions in the real world whose practices constitute the disciplinary matrix for 
ART. Boyd has already provided an adequate definition of a disciplinary matrix, so the artworld 
merely acts as content in this particular case. Because the content of disciplinary matrices (e.g., 
the academic discipline of chemistry) is naturally fuzzy, the artworld needs to be defined only 
strictly enough for us (1) to recognize it at as a possible candidate for “disciplinary matrix” and 
(2) to pick out the correct institution in the real world. And, indeed, it is hard to deny that Dickie 
is broadly characterizing an institution with which any acculturated Westerner is familiar. 
 
V. ANSWERING IRRELEVANT CRITERIA 
  Having argued for a theory of how to determine “art” as a kind and what institutions’ 
practices determine that kind, we are now ready to consider how the expanded cluster account 
handles Meskin’s primary objection to Gaut. In his article, “The Cluster Account of Art 
Reconsidered,” Meskin advances what he calls the problem of irrelevant criteria. He shows that 
because Gaut’s account allows there to be sufficient subsets of criteria, but contains the caveat 
that the criteria are disjunctively necessary once a sufficient subset is instantiated, any other 
random criterion that the object of inquiry satisfies may be “tacked on”—they can be added to 
the list as disjunctively necessary without violating the logical form of the account. Thus, criteria 
such as “having been made on a Thursday” or “being made out of chocolate” could “count 
towards” an object’s falling under the concept ART (2007: 391-2). But while irrelevant criteria 
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may not violate the logical form of Gaut’s account, “in no plausible sense does being made by a 
person whose name begins with the letter ‘B’ count as a matter of conceptual necessity toward 
the instantiation of the concept ART” (Meskin 2007: 392). The problem for Gaut, then, is that, 
based purely on the logical form of his account, there is no clear way to distinguish between 
relevant and irrelevant criteria.  
 Based on his response to earlier critics, it appears Gaut may be willing simply to bite the 
bullet in the face of Meskin’s criticisms. In response to Stephen Davies (2004), who argues that 
the Cluster Account of Art is actually a disjunctive definition, Gaut implies that his account may 
entail having a substantial list of criteria, and that it may be the case that some of them end up 
never actually being instantiated (in which case they should eventually be stricken from the set 
of properties), but this does not directly address Meskin’s problem (Gaut 2005: 286). The 
challenge of Meskin’s proposal is that, contrary to Gaut’s presupposition in his response to 
Davies, the seemingly irrelevant properties are instantiated at least occasionally, and so it is not 
clear why they do not “count towards” an object’s falling under the concept ART on Gaut’s 
account. Meskin proposes several possible avenues of response, all dealing with modifications of 
the logical form of the cluster account. I, however, would like to explore a different avenue with 
my expanded cluster account. I have chosen not to modify the logical form of Gaut’s account; 
instead, I incorporate the epistemic mechanism (disciplinary matrices) that governs the common 
usage of the concept ART—for that common usage, Gaut, channeling Wittgenstein, says, “Don’t 
think, but look!” (Gaut 2000: 28). 
 The problem with Gaut’s account is that it does not have a proper source of authority for 
generating a set of criteria. The method for criteria selection would presumably be something 
similar to reflective equilibrium. On Gaut’s view, criterial selection will proceed approximately 
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as follows: philosophers and other theorists posit a certain set of criteria, another philosopher 
raises an objection or counterexample to the first formulation, another philosopher comes along 
and reformulates the view, and this dialectic continues into the foreseeable future. The problem 
is that Meskin’s critique threatens to undermine any set of criteria proposed within the 
framework of the reflective equilibrium methodology. That is to say, given any set of artworks, 
with any set of proposed criteria, Meskin can construct a counterexample by appeal to any odd 
property that all the objects instantiate, but which would only ludicrously be deemed something 
that should “count towards” those objects’ falling under the concept ART. This irrelevant 
criterion could be something as innocuous as “constructed on Earth,” which would certainly 
apply to any example given, but which does not seem like a necessary or relevant property to 
“counting towards” an object falling under the concept of ART. While this could be considered a 
failure of the logical form of Gaut’s account, I have chosen to approach Meskin’s challenge 
otherwise, because I understand the problem differently. As I intimated previously, the problem 
is that Gaut’s account designates no authority or methodology for criterial property selection. 
Meskin is correct in pointing out that, using reflective equilibrium, it is not feasible simply to 
understand the concept ART as it is commonly used; the result will not be a stable and objective 
set of criteria. And this is precisely why relativizing the use of the concept ART to a particular 
disciplinary matrix helps us avoid Meskin’s critique. 
By relativizing the concept ART to a historical institution, reflective equilibrium is no 
longer needed for determining the relevant property cluster. Instead, an empirical historical 
approach should ground the property cluster for ART. The artworld itself must be examined and 
surveyed to understand ART. The Expanded Cluster Account designates the corresponding 
disciplinary matrix as the ultimate ground of the properties relevant to ART. Also, the people of 
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the artworld (as creators and keepers of the practices constituting the disciplinary matrix) provide 
a basis of authority for the criterial property set; if a criterion does not relate to how ART is 
actually determined by the disciplinary matrix, then it will fail the test of relevance. Thus, 
Meskin’s problem can be avoided by deferring to the actual practices of the Artworld. In fact, 
since it is relativized to a disciplinary matrix (the Artworld), the Expanded Cluster Account must 
defer to the reality of the Artworld. The primary difference between Gaut's Cluster Account and 
the Expanded Cluster Account is that the latter holds a stipulation that the set of criteria for ART 
must "track" the reality of the Artworld. Since Gaut never stipulates an authority for determining 
the plausible criteria for ART, if Meskin attempts to tack-on the property of "being made on a 
Monday" to a set of criteria that instantiates ART, it does not violate any of Gaut's stipulations 
(in spite of the properties unanimously acknowledged irrelevance). Tacking-on an irrelevant 
property to a set of criteria that instantiates ART does, however, violate the stipulation of the 
Expanded Cluster Account that criteria may count towards an object falling under ART only if it 
tracks the reality of what is understood to be relevant to falling under the concept ART to those 
in the Artworld. And if it were not the case that relativizing ART to a disciplinary matrix 
requires said stipulation, Boyd could be presented with a similar objection to his theory of kinds. 
For example, one might say that the property of "being drunk by someone on a Monday" could 
be a tacked-on to the properties that count towards a liquid instantiating the concept WATER, 
but it fails because this property fails to track the realistic interests of WATER's relevant 
disciplinary matrix. Therefore, while the Expanded Cluster Account does not obviously alter the 
logical structure of Gaut’s account, its inheritance from Boyd and resulting stipulation render the 
account immune to Meskin’s objection. 
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VI. WHY EXPAND? 
Of course, the Expanded Cluster Account must provide more than a solution to Meskin’s 
objection, otherwise it stands only on as sure a footing as competing theories, namely Longworth 
and Scarantino’s Disjunctive Theory of Art and Dean’s Prototype Theory of Art. In short, the 
Expanded Cluster Account of Art must, in addition, demonstrate that it provides a more 
comprehensive explanation for the history of art and can accommodate future instances of 
artworks. Let us begin by revisiting Longworth’s and Scarantino’s, and Dean’s theories. 
 Longworth and Scarantino’s (2010) project is, like the Expanded Cluster Account, 
motivated by Meskin’s “irrelevant criteria” objection to the Cluster Account of Art, but their 
solution actually follows from Meskin’s own suggestion of how Gaut might respond to his 
criticism. Setting aside concerns that Meskin (and thus Longworth and Scarantino) has 
misidentified the problem with Gaut’s account, Longworth and Scarantino, on Meskin’s 
suggestion, formalize a disjunctive account that systematically prescribes ambiguities in the 
theory, yet obviates the “irrelevant criteria” objection. Exactly how Longworth and Scarantino 
answer Meskin’s objection is not of particular importance to us, but let us rehearse their final 
formalization of the Disjunctive Theory of Art: 
∃Z∃Y(Art↔(Z v Y)),where (i) Z and Y are either non-empty conjunctions (e.g. P & Q & 
R) or non-empty disjunctions of conjunctions (e.g. (Q & R & S & T) (P & Q & W) v. . .); 
(ii) there is some indeterminacy over exactly which disjuncts are sufficient; (iii) Z does 
not entail Y and Y does not entail Z; (iv) Z does not entail Art and Y does not entail Art. 
(2010: 13) 
The above formalization essentially captures Gaut’s Cluster Account of Art by stating ART is 
characterized by a necessary disjunct of combined disjuncts and conjuncts that are sufficient for 
instantiating the concept ART. With the Disjunctive Account of Art in mind, let us consider 
Dean’s prototype theory of art. 
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 Unlike the Disjunctive Theory of Art, Dean’s prototype theory of art is neither directly 
related to Gaut’s Cluster Account nor motivated by Meskin’s “irrelevant criteria” objections. 
Instead, Dean proposes his prototype theory as an alternative to and as a contender for an anti-
definitional account of art. But, much like the (Expanded) Cluster Account of Art, Dean’s 
prototype theory is motivated by developments in the theory of concepts in both the 
psychological and philosophical literature. Eponymously, Dean’s theory suggests that art might 
be a prototype concept, as opposed to a cluster concept, for instance. While, as discussed 
previously, there are several different formulations of how a concept may be prototypically 
structured, Dean’s particular proposal gives “an account of the psychological process of 
categorization in terms of ‘similarity’ to the set of properties that constitute the prototype. A 
quantitative measure of similarity is calculated based on how many properties an individual 
shares with the prototype, with properties usually being weighted according to typicality” 
(Laurence and Margolis 1999: 15). Simply put, Dean’s prototype theory proposes that ART can 
be properly captured only by understanding the prototypical structure of the concept, that, similar 
to Gaut, certain sets of varyingly typical criteria may sufficiently determine if an object falls 
under the concept ART. In this case, Dean’s prototype theory and a cluster account of art differ 
in at least two aspects: (1) Dean’s theory statistically weighs the occurrence and typicality of a 
property to be found in artworks and (2) it suggests that the criterial properties for determining 
the concept ART should be extrapolated from folk conceptions of artworks.  Now, with these 
two theories, in mind, I turn my attention to how the second difference between Dean’s theory 
and a cluster account shows the Expanded Cluster Account of Art to be more explanatorily 
robust than its competitors. 
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 The first feature of the Expanded Cluster Account I will draw attention to is that it 
provides a mechanism by which it is possible to determine the list of criteria of the cluster 
concept ART. In fact, it is this feature that inoculates it against Meskin’s objection. By 
relativizing the concept ART to a disciplinary matrix, the Expanded Cluster Account is able to 
examine the actual views that emerge in the disciplinary matrix in order to determine what 
counts as part of the criteria for the concept ART at a given time. That is to say, the disciplinary 
matrix is not only available to us now for inspection, but it is also available throughout history by 
various investigative means. Based on the Expanded Cluster Account of Art one could not only 
ascertain the contemporary criteria for ART, but one could also look at anthropological and 
sociological evidence to ascertain the criteria of ART in Ancient Greece (which naturally also 
changed over time). The Artworld and criteria of ART may co-evolve throughout history, but an 
investigation of the relationship between the two at a given point in history can reveal the 
concept ART for that era. 
 Thus, the Expanded Cluster Account is, again, essentially historical—it can provide 
insight into ART not only in contemporary times, but, with enough work, it can provide a 
complete historical picture of the evolution of the concept ART. The Expanded Cluster Account 
makes explicit the relationship between society and art as well as the historical development of 
art. That is to say, that the Expanded Cluster Account holds that the criteria that count towards an 
object falling under the concept ART can only be properly determined by understanding the 
interplay of the Artworld, artists and art objects, thus one must look at the details of this nexus in 
order to develop the plausible criteria for ART. Competing theories of the Expanded Cluster 
Account are not relativized to a disciplinary matrix and may still adapt to changing 
understandings of ART over time; however, competing theories do not make explicit how such 
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changes in the plausible criteria for ART have occurred. For example, while the ECA may point 
to photography as a significant factor in the rise in Impressionism and other anti-realistic 
movements in painting, competing accounts do not have the conceptual resources to explain why 
a change in the plausible criteria for ART has occurred. 
 Insofar as the Expanded Cluster Account is explanatorily historical, it provides an 
explanation to that which frustrates all accounts of art: how is it that contemporary art is the 
same kind of thing as Renaissance art or Roman pottery? Most famously posed by Arthur Danto 
(1964), the question of how the development of art led to Mondrian’s geometric pieces, for 
instance, is a question for which every account of art should have an answer. The Expanded 
Cluster Account, as a model for inquiry, not only proposes that it is legitimate to call our current 
concept ART the same concept of ART that existed in the Middle Ages, but may also provide an 
explanation of the historical development of ART. The Expanded Cluster Account achieves the 
former by explicitly showing grounding the concept ART in the historical co-evolution of its 
disciplinary matrix and exemplary artworks and it achieves the latter by allowing one to point to 
historical facts or events that caused the development of disciplinary matrix or exemplary 
artworks. Given what the Expanded Cluster Account can explain, let us consider its competitors. 
 Longworth and Scarantino’s Disjunctive Theory of Art, like Gaut’s account, explicitly 
does not attempt to determine the relevant set of criteria for ART—it merely assumes Gaut’s 
criteria for the sake of argument (2010: 12). One may be tempted to argue here, then, that lacking 
a mechanism for determining the criteria of ART should not be held against the theory. 
However, here I am advancing the claim that the Expanded Cluster Account is more 
explanatorily robust than its competitors, which can be shown precisely by revealing phenomena 
that require explanation and considering which of the competing theories provide the best 
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explanation for the phenomena in question. In this case, it is straightforwardly clear that the 
Expanded Cluster Account can make explicit a comprehensive explanation of the development 
and history of the criteria of ART where the Disjunctive Theory of Art does not even attempt to 
explain. The Expanded Cluster Account is more explanatorily robust than the Disjunctive Theory 
of Art in regard to the question at hand simpliciter. 
 Unlike Longworth and Scarantino, Dean in his prototype theory does not so easily cede 
its lack of a mechanism for determining the relevant properties of ART. Dean’s prototype theory 
assumes that, if we are to understand and statistically systematize how people use the concept 
ART, one must actually study the typicality effects in psychological experiments (Dean 2003: 
31-2). Even if Dean does not prescribe this directly, this is an implication of suggesting ART as a 
prototypical concept. If psychological research is required in order for the prototype theory 
accurately to generate a list of the prototypical properties of ART, then Dean’s theory is less 
explanatorily robust than the Expanded Cluster Account in two ways: (1) the prototype theory is 
susceptible to the aforementioned objection that it cannot easily account for atypical cases of the 
concept and (2) it would be impossible to get an accurate historical picture of how the typical 
properties of art have developed over time; prototype theory cannot answer Danto’s question 
about what makes frescoes and contemporary conceptual art the same kind of thing. Since there 
is no way to run psychological experiments on people of the past, it would be impossible to 
really get an accurate profile of the typical properties of ART—the best one could achieve with 
prototype theory is to understand the development of ART from contemporary times into the 
future. Similar to the Disjunctive Theory of Art, Dean never explicitly states that one of the goals 
of prototype theory is to explain such historical phenomena, however, for the reasons previously 
stated, it is relevant for adjudicating between a set of competing theories. 
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 Having established the historical explanatory robustness of the Expanded Cluster 
Account, particularly in contrast to competing theories, I would like to draw attention to a second 
arena in which the Expanded Cluster Account is more explanatorily efficacious: assimilating 
new data. That is to say, the Expanded Cluster Account is responsive not only to developments 
in the Artworld’s use of ART, but also novel instances of objects that may qualify as artworks. 
The Expanded Cluster Account is sensitive to future developments of ART due to its inherent 
structure. Because in the Expanded Cluster Account ART is co-determined by the Artworld and 
the actual objects (and their properties) in the world, it is necessarily responsive to novelties and 
changes in either category. Imagine, for example, that a well-regarded chef is opening a new 
restaurant that features a hitherto unconceptualized type of cuisine so marvelous nearly all of its 
critics and patrons think it worthy of being considered an object of ART. The Expanded Cluster 
Account may then properly judge that the novel cuisine is worthy of the concept ART based on 
both the Artworld’s reception of it (e.g., it is taken up for aesthetic appreciation by art critics) 
and on the actual properties of the object (e.g., the object is formally beautiful, the object is 
emotionally forceful). Through a complex and organic co-evolution of the Artworld and novel 
objects, the concept ART evolves on the Expanded Cluster Account. 
 The same cannot be said for either the Disjunctive Theory of Art or Dean’s prototype 
theory. The Disjunctive Theory of Art, simply enough, does not attempt to incorporate a 
mechanism for determining the worthiness of novel objects as artworks. While Longworth and 
Scarantino, like Gaut, absolutely leave open the possibility that the criteria for ART will change 
over time, they provide no predictive machinery and no account of how a novel object will be 
properly categorized as ART. Dean’s prototype account will also be explanatorily deficient in 
regard to categorizing novel objects. In fact, as commented before, one of the primary issues 
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with a prototype theory of concepts is that they cannot account for how atypical objects end up 
still instantiating a given concept. That is to say, it is difficult for a prototype theory of the 
concept GRANDMOTHER to explain very young grandmothers who don’t wear glasses, like 
children, or have gray hair. Similarly, a prototype theory of ART will find it difficult or not 
impossible to give an explanation of how one is supposed to regard novel (and thus atypical) 
objects as properly categorized as ART. If the chef’s groundbreaking cuisine is suddenly being 
considered as instantiating ART, Dean’s theory will have a hard time accounting for how 
something that would rate very low as a typical property of art (e.g., it is not a standardly 
recognized medium of art) could still be considered an artwork. Admittedly, a prototype theorist 
might argue that if one keeps checking and reevaluating the typical properties of ART, such 
novel objects or media would likely eventually be incorporated into the folk’s concept ART. 
However, even if novel objects eventually assimilate into the folk concept ART, this tells only 
one side of the story, namely it fails to address what it was about the object in the first place that 
influenced developments in the folk concept ART. The Expanded Cluster Account, alas, is able 
to provide a more complete picture, a more robust explanation than competing theories for the 
developments in concept ART. 
 Given this discussion, I surmise that the Expanded Cluster Account is a more complete 
theory on two important axes: (1) it seems to explain better the historical data about the concept 
ART, and (2) it provides a more accurate and complete predictive mechanism for dealing with 
the future developments of the concept ART. Based on these two important properties of any 
good theory, the Expanded Cluster Account of Art should be adopted over its competing 
theories. However, a theory’s robustness is often proportional to the objections it may raise. Let 
me now consider one important objection in particular. 
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 One objection to the Expanded Cluster Account’s integration of disciplinary matrices is 
about the vagueness of who or what comprises the disciplinary matrix, in this case, the artworld. 
For instance, one may object that there will always be competing opinions and arguments over 
what instantiates the concept ART and which objects then fall under that concept. How is one to 
mitigate this vagueness? Are some groups more privileged than others? I think the proper 
response to such concerns is that, naturally, it is important to consider expertise and the validity 
of arguments when assessing a particular group or individuals participation in the artworld—
those who know more about art and are thus more capable of making intelligent arguments in 
regard to art should be privileged over the folks intuition, but there need not be any systematic 
rules about privilege within a disciplinary matrix. If anything, I think the issue of vagueness 
illustrates the explanatory power of the Expanded Cluster Account. Taking a cue from Gaut 
(2000), agreements and disagreements within a disciplinary matrix create a nice “map” of the 
sufficient sets of criteria for instantiating ART. Cases in which there is no controversy within the 
artworld (e.g., the Mona Lisa) provide clues as to what a sufficient set of criteria for instantiating 
ART might be, while, as we move to more and more controversial cases (e.g., the imaginary 
groundbreaking cuisine), the actual “borders” of certain sufficient sets of criteria become 
evident. At the same time, this map provides the basis for categorizing objects as ART—one 
might make an analogical argument for the inclusion of the imaginary breakthrough cuisine as an 
artwork based on another uncontroversial case that shares its criterial profile. Moreover, insofar 
as the Expanded Cluster Account attempts to provide a realistic account of the concept ART, 
charges of vagueness are not objectionable, but, in fact, necessary. Simply put, the world is fuzzy 
and any theory that attempts to capture this should naturally be fuzzy as well, otherwise it fails to 
capture the truth about how concepts operate. Both the necessity and the benefits of having 
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vagueness built into the Expanded Cluster Account reveal an objection based on vagueness to be 
an advantage. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the Expanded Cluster Account of Art is the most comprehensive and 
explanatory anti-definitional account of art available today. I motivate my theory from a survey 
of the current plausible theories of concepts, a naturalistic approach to concept analysis, and the 
failures of definitional enterprise in philosophy of art heretofore. My arguments center around 
the explanatory efficacy of Gaut’s Cluster Account of Art integrated with Boyd’s theory of 
kinds, demonstrating how such a theory not only answers Meskin’s “irrelevant criteria” 
objection, but also convincingly explains the historical and future data—the most convincing 
feature of any worthwhile theory. I only hope that I have been convincing enough here for the 
project of the Expanded Cluster Account to be continued, as there is still much to be done. A 
complete account of the theory is further charged with tracking and explaining the developments 
of ART throughout history as well as demonstrating the theory’s resilience as future 
controversial cases unfold. There is still much to be done, but here I have presented the necessary 
tools for future research into the anti-definitional approach to the concept ART. 
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